Wearables are widely used for health data collection due to
their availability and advanced sensors, enabling smart
health applications like stress detection. However, the
sensitivity of personal health data raises significant
privacy concerns. While user de-identification by removing
direct identifiers such as names and addresses is commonly
employed to protect privacy, the data itself can still be
exploited to re-identify individuals. We introduce a novel
framework for similarity-based Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
re-identification attacks on time series health data. Using
the WESAD dataset and two larger synthetic datasets, we
demonstrate that even short segments of sensor data can
achieve perfect re-identification with our
Slicing-DTW-Attack. Our attack is independent of training
data and computes similarity rankings in about 2 minutes for
10,000 subjects on a single CPU core. These findings
highlight that de-identification alone is insufficient to
protect privacy. As a defense, we show that adding random
noise to the signals significantly reduces re-identification
risk while only moderately affecting usability in stress
detection tasks, offering a promising approach to balancing
privacy and utility.
%0 Journal Article
%1 Lange2023-cn
%A Lange, Lucas
%A Schreieder, Tobias
%A Christen, Victor
%A Rahm, Erhard
%D 2023
%K Xack data health smartwatch
%T Slice it up: Unmasking user identities in smartwatch health data
%X Wearables are widely used for health data collection due to
their availability and advanced sensors, enabling smart
health applications like stress detection. However, the
sensitivity of personal health data raises significant
privacy concerns. While user de-identification by removing
direct identifiers such as names and addresses is commonly
employed to protect privacy, the data itself can still be
exploited to re-identify individuals. We introduce a novel
framework for similarity-based Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
re-identification attacks on time series health data. Using
the WESAD dataset and two larger synthetic datasets, we
demonstrate that even short segments of sensor data can
achieve perfect re-identification with our
Slicing-DTW-Attack. Our attack is independent of training
data and computes similarity rankings in about 2 minutes for
10,000 subjects on a single CPU core. These findings
highlight that de-identification alone is insufficient to
protect privacy. As a defense, we show that adding random
noise to the signals significantly reduces re-identification
risk while only moderately affecting usability in stress
detection tasks, offering a promising approach to balancing
privacy and utility.
@article{Lange2023-cn,
abstract = {Wearables are widely used for health data collection due to
their availability and advanced sensors, enabling smart
health applications like stress detection. However, the
sensitivity of personal health data raises significant
privacy concerns. While user de-identification by removing
direct identifiers such as names and addresses is commonly
employed to protect privacy, the data itself can still be
exploited to re-identify individuals. We introduce a novel
framework for similarity-based Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
re-identification attacks on time series health data. Using
the WESAD dataset and two larger synthetic datasets, we
demonstrate that even short segments of sensor data can
achieve perfect re-identification with our
Slicing-DTW-Attack. Our attack is independent of training
data and computes similarity rankings in about 2 minutes for
10,000 subjects on a single CPU core. These findings
highlight that de-identification alone is insufficient to
protect privacy. As a defense, we show that adding random
noise to the signals significantly reduces re-identification
risk while only moderately affecting usability in stress
detection tasks, offering a promising approach to balancing
privacy and utility.},
added-at = {2025-01-08T11:25:15.000+0100},
author = {Lange, Lucas and Schreieder, Tobias and Christen, Victor and Rahm, Erhard},
biburl = {https://puma.scadsai.uni-leipzig.de/bibtex/2865a7e46b73a5ff4b88beb0dbeccd520/scadsfct},
eprint = {2308.08310},
interhash = {1f051c10f9d80d631983043ac61fea3d},
intrahash = {865a7e46b73a5ff4b88beb0dbeccd520},
keywords = {Xack data health smartwatch},
primaryclass = {cs.CR},
timestamp = {2025-02-05T11:44:16.000+0100},
title = {Slice it up: Unmasking user identities in smartwatch health data},
year = 2023
}